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PUNITIVE DAMAGES REVISITED: A STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF HOW FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS
DECIDE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SUCH
AWARDS
HIRONARI MOMIOKA
“It is of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line, though he cannot with
it fathom all the depths of the ocean.”
-John Locke
ABSTRACT
Using data from punitive damages decisions of U.S. federal circuit courts from
2004 to 2012, this paper attempts to establish empirically the following: (1) there is
no apparent statistical difference between the levels of jury and judge awards; (2)
U.S. Supreme Court decisions such as Philip Morris (2007) or Exxon (2008) do not
actually or substantially affect the level of punitive damage awards; (3) with regard
to the cases involving remittitur, or reduction of awards, the Exxon decision did not
radically affect the decreasing ratio of punitive to compensatory damage awards; (4)
as the levels of compensatory awards go up, the ratio becomes strikingly low and
stable; (5) finally, the proportionality between punitive and compensatory awards is
not the key factor that influences upper court judges when they consider the
constitutionality of punitive damages. Unexplained portions of the relationship
between the amount of punitive damages and the wealth of a defendant remain to be
examined further.
CONTENTS
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 380
CASES OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A SUMMARY ......................................... 384
A. The Pre-BMW of North America, Inc. v Gore Period: Punitive
Damage Awards Not Constitutionally Limited .............................. 385
B. BMW of North America v. Gore (1996) and its Aftermath: Punitive
Damages Awards Constitutionally Limited ................................... 386
C. State Farm (2003): Single Digit Rule ............................................. 387
D. Philip Morris (2007): Procedural Due Process ............................. 388
E. Exxon (2008): One to One Ratio Rule ........................................... 389
F. This Article’s Contribution to an Understanding of Punitive Damages
Awards ........................................................................................... 390
DATA AND MAIN RESULTS ..................................................................... 391
A. The Data Used in This Study ......................................................... 391
B. The Punitive to Compensatory Damages Ratio ............................. 391
C. Judge-Jury Differences .................................................................. 392
D. Case Category, Case Types, Party Status, and Locale .................. 394
1. Case Category ....................................................................... 397

III.



Professor, Asahikawa Campus, Hokkaido University of Education, Japan.

379

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017

1

380

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:379

2. Litigant Type ......................................................................... 397
The Supreme Court Decisions and Circuit Court Judges .............. 398
1. Punitive Damages over Time: Ratio by Year ........................ 398
2. Punitive Damages over Time: Ratio by Period ..................... 399
3. Reduced Damages (Remittitur) ............................................. 401
F. Stratifying the Punitive to Compensatory Ratio ............................ 403
G. Federal Circuit Court and Punitive Damages ............................... 405
1. Federal Circuit Court Judges’ Decisions to Affirm or Deny
Awarded Punitive Damages .................................................. 405
2. Logistic Regression Models of Whether or Not Awarded
Punitive Damages Were Affirmed ........................................ 406
DISCUSSION ............................................................................................ 407
A. Key Findings .................................................................................. 407
B. Implications of This Study ............................................................. 408
C. Limits of the Present Study ............................................................ 409
CONCLUSION........................................................................................... 409
E.

IV.

V.

I. INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages have become an increasingly controversial subject, in both
scholarly and legislative debate, over the past three decades in the United States. One
of the reasons why punitive damages are hotly debated in U.S. tort reform debates is
that punitive damages award amounts can be quite large—even astronomical. One
illustration is the Supreme Court’s 2007 Philip Morris USA v. Williams decision.1 In
this case, a jury in Oregon awarded the plaintiff (the widow of a heavy smoker)
$79.5 million in punitive damages at trial. 2 In that regard, civil jury trials and
punitive damages in general are, more often than not, a target of audible public
criticism, inter alia from tort reformers.
By no means are debates regarding punitive damage awards limited to the United
States. Punitive damage awards are also a source of tension in international civil
justice relations. For example, the Supreme Court of Japan dealt with a civil case in
1997 where one of the legal issues was whether punitive damages, awarded by a
California court, could be compulsorily required through civil procedure in Japan. 3
The Court refused to order the defendant to pay punitive damages on the grounds
that such awards went against public policy in Japan.4 One might say, however, that
the raison d’être of—or public policy reasons behind—punitive damage awards
seem underappreciated by the Japanese Court.
In Japanese legal academic circles, much lengthy attention has been paid to the
punitive awards system from the viewpoint of punishing or deterring defendants’

1

Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).

2

Id. at 350.

3

For a full account of this case, see Norman T. Braslow, The Recognition and
Enforcement of Common Law Punitive Damages in a Civil Law System: Some Reflections on
the Japanese Experience, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 285, 288-99 (1999).
4 See John Y. Gotanda, Charting Developments Concerning Punitive Damages: Is the
Tide Changing?, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 514, 518, 528 (2007) (stating refusals to
enforce judgments by Japanese, Italian, and German courts).
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wrongdoing via civil lawsuits.5 That is partly because Japan’s legal system has
neither punitive damages nor jury trials in the civil system and partly because the
public law system, which includes criminal and administrative proceedings, does not
necessarily function so effectively as to punish or deter a huge corporation’s
wrongdoings.6 In sum, punitive damages awards are alien to the Japanese legal
system, but the heated controversy over such awards is nonetheless of great interest
to a host of jurists in Japan.7
In order to cope with these issues, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly
attempted to stop or prevent punitive awards from “running wild” or “skyrocketing”
by suggesting that the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution limit the
punitive damages regime.8 Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court held that: (1)
punitive damages could violate the substantive due process of law if they are
“grossly excessive” in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,9 (2) a single digit
punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio is more likely to comport with due process
in State Farm Auto. Ins. v. Campbell,10 (3) the jury shall not take into consideration
the harm that the misconduct caused others when calculating the punitive damages in
Philip Morris USA v. Williams,11 and (4) under maritime law, the ratio shall not
exceed one in Exxon Shipping v. Baker.12
In parallel with the U.S. Supreme Court’s intense attempts to prevent punitive
awards from “skyrocketing,” quite a few states have passed legislation imposing
various limits on punitive awards over the course of the last two decades. There are
several types of statutory regulations:13 absolute monetary caps,14 maximum ratio of
punitive to compensatory awards,15 and a combination of the two. 16 In addition, there
5 Saisiri Siriviriyakul, The Imposition of Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis 50
(2012) (on file with the Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign).
6

Jeffrey Hays, Legal System in Japan—History, Judges, Lawyers, Long Trials,
Convictions,
FACTS
&
DETAILS
(Jan.
2013),
http://factsanddetails.com/japan/cat22/sub147/item807.html.
7 See, e.g., Hisashi Aizawa et al., Recent Developments in Punitive Damages Laws, 72
COMP. L. J. 110, 110-35, 216-18 (2011) (summary in English).
8

Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).

9 BMW of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996). For more details, see infra
Section II.B and accompanying text.
10

State Farm Mut. Aut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). For more details,
see infra Section II.C and accompanying text.
11 Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 355 (2007). For more details, see infra
Section II.D and accompanying text.
12 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 513 (2008). For more details, see infra
Section II.E and accompanying text.
13

See generally JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW
487-525 (2d ed. 2012).

AND PRACTICE

14 The Virginia statute, for example, limits the total amount of punitive damages to
$350,000. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (2016). Similarly, the Georgia statute limits the amount
of such damages to $250,000. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(g) (2016).
15 The State of Colorado has limited the amount of punitive damages to the amount of
actual damages. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(2) (2016).
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are several other ways that courts have exercised greater judicial control over
punitive awards, including lifting the burden of proof,17 ordering payment to a state
fund,18 requiring the plaintiff to prove the defendant’s wealth, 19 bifurcation of trials,20
and judicial determination of the punitive damage amount. 21
On the other hand, the underlying debate over the unpredictability of punitive
awards still simmers in legal academic circles. A considerable number of statistical
studies have been conducted on the punitive damages system. 22 Through those
16 A number of states have adopted this type of restriction. Florida, for example, has
limited any punitive damage recovery to three times the amount of compensatory damages
awarded or $500,000, whichever is greater. FLA. STAT. § 768.73(1)(a) (2016). Likewise, in
South Carolina, three times, $500,000, S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-530(A) (2016); Tennessee,
two times, $500,000, TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104(a)(5) (2016); and Arkansas, three times,
$250,000, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-208(a)(1) (2016). Another version of a limitation includes
the wealth of the defendant: a Montana statute provides that an award for punitive damages
may not exceed $10 million or 3% of a defendant’s net worth, whichever is less. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-220(3) (2015).
17 To date, Colorado is the only jurisdiction that has lifted the burden of proof to “beyond
a reasonable doubt,” instead of “clear and convincing proof” or “preponderance of evidence.”
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (2016).
18

Several states have enacted legislation authorizing distribution of some portion of the
punitive damages to a state or public entity. In Georgia, for example, 75% of any amounts
awarded as punitive or exemplary damages must be paid into the treasury of the state. GA.
CODE. ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (2016); see also Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539, 542
(1993).
19 Several jurisdictions have limited the introduction of evidence regarding the
defendant’s wealth when a claim for punitive damages is made, so that the fact finder can
concentrate on the defendant’s conduct rather than on her or his “wealth.” Florida, for
example, allows no discovery of the defendant’s financial worth “unless there is a reasonable
showing . . . for recovery of [punitive] damages.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72 (2016). These
changes represent legislative attempts to minimize the prejudicial effects of otherwise relevant
evidence in punitive damages litigation.
20

Several jurisdictions provide by statute that the trial must be bifurcated to separate
punitive damage claim from the underlying liability issues including compensatory damages.
For example, Georgia, Montana, and Nevada require bifurcation in all punitive damage cases.
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(d) (2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7) (2015); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 42.005(3) (2015).
21 A few states, including Kansas, have enacted legislation requiring the court, rather than
the jury, to determine the amount of any punitive damage award. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 603701(a) (2016).
22
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Judge-Jury Difference in Punitive
Damages Awards: Who Listens to the Supreme Court?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325
(2011) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Heise, Judge-Jury Difference]; Theodore Eisenberg et al.,
The Decision to Award Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 2 J. L. ANAL. 577 (2010)
[hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Empirical Study]; Theodore Eisenberg et al., Variability in
Punitive Damages: Empirically Assessing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 166 J. INST. &
THEORETICAL ECON. 5 (2010) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive Damages];
Neil Vidmar & Mirya Holman, The Frequency, Predictability, and Proportionality of Jury
Awards of Punitive Damages in State Courts in 2005: A New Audit, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
855 (2010); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Significant Association Between
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empirical studies, including those conducted by Cornell Law Professor Theodore
Eisenberg, there is a recognition that punitive damages are rarely awarded and the
amount assessed by the jury is lower than originally imagined. 23 Conversely, some
critics, including Harvard Law Professor W. Kip Viscusi, argue that punitive awards
resulting from jury trials are unpredictable and that “juries are especially likely to
make a large punitive damages award” in comparison to judges. 24
There have been, however, no full-fledged empirical or statistical studies that
examine the relationship between the Supreme Court’s position on the
constitutionality of punitive damages and the behavior of lower courts involving
punitive awards claims. In other words, notwithstanding its extreme importance,
very few attempts have been made to explain how the Supreme Court decisions have
influenced the lower courts within the scheme of punitive damages.25
This raises an interesting underlying question: Does the punitive damages award
regime operate to punish or deter wrongful acts, or does the award serve the
American public in some other way? How and to what extent punitive damages
function in American society is of great interest. According to Justice Holmes, the
law does not exist in a vacuum, but responds to “felt needs of society”26 Law and the
system that enforces it, such as the civil jury procedure, case law, and so on, have
close relations to the society to which they belong. Ubi societas, ibi ius, as the
Roman legal maxim goes.27 It is undoubtedly a crux of the debate over the punitive
damages system.
At the same time, it is extremely hard and almost impossible to prove or find
evidence of the link between laws. Therefore, as a preliminary and exploratory
study, this article will explore the connection between the U.S. Supreme Court
decisions mentioned above and lower courts decisions, with respect to punitive
damages awarded.
Specifically, this article examines the impact of major U.S. Supreme Court
decisions regarding punitive damages, such as Philip Morris and Exxon, on lower
courts. This article gathers and analyzes data spanning eight years (2004-2012) from
federal circuit court decisions. Considering this new data set will augment analysis
contained in previous studies by providing more detailed and nuanced insight.
Punitive and Compensatory Damages in Blockbuster Cases: A Methodological Primer, 3 J.
EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 175 (2006).
23

See, e.g., Eisenberg et al., Empirical Study, supra note 22, at 578-89.

24

See, e.g., Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries
Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 36 (2004) [hereinafter Hersch & Viscusi, Perform]; see also
W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313,
342 (2001) (stating that jurors informed with a detailed rationale and mathematical formula
for setting punitive damages would not perform well).
25 See Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, An Empirical Analysis of Section 1983 Qualified
Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523 (2010).
26

Michael C. Lasky, Recent Developments in Employment Law, FINDLAW,
http://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/recent-developments-in-employment-law.html
(last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
27 Frank J. Garcia, Between Cosmopolis and Community: The Emerging Basis for Global
Justice, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 1 n.1 (2013). The Roman legal maxim translates to,
“Where there is society, there are laws.” Id.
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Furthermore, this article attempts to examine both whether the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages significantly differs across different levels of compensatory
damages and what kind of factors appellate judges consider most frequently when
deciding the validity or adequacy of punitive awards, from the perspective of
substantive due process. This study utilizes a statistical approach.28
Section II begins with an examination of U.S. Supreme Court decisions dealing
with the issue of punitive damages. Section III elaborates on the descriptive results
of the analysis, using several statistical techniques. Section IV discusses the results,
and Section V provides a conclusion.
II. CASES OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A SUMMARY

The punitive damages system is well established in American tort law. For more
than two decades, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has amended the punitive
damages regime in quite a few decisions, resulting in important constitutional
restrictions on such awards. These decisions include: Browning-Ferris Industries of
Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,29 Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip,30 TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,31 BMW of North
America Inc. v. Gore,32 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,33
Philip Morris USA v. Williams,34 and Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker.35
28

Adopting this kind of “statistical” or “empirical” approach to a legal phenomenon is
less common, prevalent, or widely used in America, even less so in Japan. However, an
empirical approach is essential and valuable because every single legal doctrine shall be based
upon a precise grasp of status quo. I firmly believe so precisely because I have obtained
corroborative evidence that data results correctly gathered and analyzed are of great use and
importance because of my previous work concerning an attitudinal survey on indigenous
people’s civil rights in Hokkaido, Japan. See Hironari Momioka, Taking Minority Rights
Seriously: A Statistical Analysis of the Attitude Survey of Ainu Culture Law, part 2, 58 (2) J.
HOKKAIDO U. EDUC. 17 (2008); Hironari Momioka, Civil Rights and the Courts: A Statistical
Analysis of the Attitude Survey of The Nibutani Dam Decision and Ainu Culture Law, 113 (5
& 6) CHUO L. REV. 33 (2007). Furthermore, in the future, I will extend the methodology
employed in this project to examining areas such as judicial review, freedom of the press, and
equal protection of the law. Specifically, I expect that logistic regression models can be
applied to an analysis of judicial review.
29 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259
(1989).
30

Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 4 (1991).

31

TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446 (1993).

32

BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562-63 (1996).

33

State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412 (2003).

34

Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007).

35

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 475-76 (2008). There are other Supreme
Court decisions, such as Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443
(2001) (observing that de novo standard, instead of abuse of discretion standard, is required
when the federal appeal courts examine punitive awards); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512
U.S. 415, 418 (1994) (stating that a state constitutional provision limiting judicial review of
the size of punitive damage awards was in violation of the Due Process of the federal
Constitution).
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A. The Pre-BMW of North America, Inc. v Gore Period: Punitive Damage Awards
Not Constitutionally Limited
In Browning-Ferris, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a large punitive
damages award violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition on “excessive fines.”36
In this case, the defendant attempted to pressure the plaintiff to leave a local disposal
business by engaging in illegal price-fixing and interference with contracts.37 The
jury awarded the plaintiff $51,146 in compensatory damages and $6 million in
punitive damages.38 The Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to
limit punitive damages in this case because the plaintiff was a non-governmental
party.39
In the Haslip case, the Court addressed the issue of whether the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to punitive damages. 40 The Court approved the punitive damage
award granted at trial, which was more than four times the amount of compensatory
damages awarded.41 The Court commented that “unlimited jury discretion . . . in the
fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one’s constitutional
sensibilities.”42 Because the actual jury instructions at issue, however, ensured that
the jury’s discretion was “exercised within reasonable constraints,”43 the punitive
awards did not violate the due process of the law. 44
Haslip also contains reference to the goals of punitive damages.45 With respect to
the specific jury instructions at issue, the Court explained that the very purpose of
such awards is not to compensate, but to punish the wrongdoers and “protect the
public by [deterring] the defendant and others” 46 from engaging in similar harmful
acts in the future. According to the instructions given in Haslip, the Court called
upon the jury to take into consideration “the character and the degree of the wrong as
shown by the evidence and the necessity of preventing similar wrong.” 47 The Court
concluded that the states’ appellate review of such awards also limited the jury’s
discretion.48
36 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260
(1989).
37

Id. at 261.

38

Id. at 262.

39

Id. at 263-64.

40

Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 12 (1991).

41

Id. at 23-24.

42

Id. at 18.

43

Id. at 20.

44

Id.

45

Id. at 19.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id. at 21. In Haslip, Justice O’Connor was the sole dissenter. Depicting the punitive
damages system as a “powerful weapon,” she contended that there had been an explosion in
the frequency and size of punitive damages and that juries were not constrained in their
discretion. Id. at 61-63 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court again upheld a punitive damages award in
TXO.49 In that case, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages was
remarkably 526 times larger than the compensatory damages awarded. 50 The main
issue the Court considered was whether the ratio violated the Due Process Clause.51
In support of its claim for punitive damages at trial, the plaintiff presented evidence
that the defendant had “engaged in similar nefarious activities in its business
dealings in other parts of the country.” 52
Relying on Haslip, the Court declined to draw mathematical bright lines and
went on to note that “it is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential harm
that the defendant’s conduct would have caused its intended victim . . . as well as the
possible harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior
were not deterred.”53 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the punitive damage
award was not excessive in light of due process because of the large amount of
money at stake, the defendant’s bad faith, a larger pattern of fraud and deceit, and
the defendant’s wealth.54 Thus, the Court’s finding was that no due process violation
occurred in TXO55 or in Haslip.56
B. BMW of North America v. Gore (1996) and its Aftermath: Punitive Damages
Awards Constitutionally Limited
The U.S. Supreme Court stated, for the first time, in its landmark decision of
BMW57, that excessive punitive awards could violate the Due Process Clause.58 In
BMW, the defendant, a national dealership, failed to disclose that the brand new car
it sold to the plaintiff had been repainted before delivery. 59 At trial, the actual
damages were only $4,000, but the jury in Alabama awarded $4 million in punitive
damages (later reduced on appeal to $2 million). 60
The issue the Court considered in BMW was whether the punitive damages award
violated the Due Process Clause.61 Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for the
Court and set forth a legal standard composed of three guideposts to test whether or
not a punitive damage award is “grossly excessive” and too arbitrary to be

49

TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1993).

50

Id. at 453.

51

Id. at 446.

52

Id. at 450-51.

53

Id. at 460.

54

Id. at 462.

55

Id. at 453.

56

Id. at 459.

57

BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 559 (1996).

58

Id. at 562.

59

Id. at 563-64.

60

Id. at 565.

61

Id. at 562.
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constitutional.62 The guideposts were based on the notion that the defendant should
“receive . . . fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment,
but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.” 63 The first and “most
important” guidepost is whether the damages are commensurate to the level of
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct. 64 The second is whether a reasonable
relationship exists between the amounts of compensatory and punitive damages. 65
However, the Court refused to define what ratio constitutes “reasonable
relationship.”66 The last guidepost is a comparison of the punitive damage award to
the civil or criminal penalties imposed for equivalent conduct. 67 The Court also held
that punitive damages cannot punish a defendant for conduct committed in another
state.68 Applying these three factors to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that
the punitive damage award in this case was unconstitutionally excessive. 69
In BMW, the votes were split.70 Justices Ginsburg and Rehnquist dissented on the
grounds that states permitting punitive damages have an interest in punishment and
deterrence and that the Court unwisely infringed on the realm of state law because
the procedure fully satisfied due process. 71 Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented on
the substantive due process review and denounced the three guideposts as “a road to
nowhere.”72
C. State Farm (2003): Single Digit Rule
In the next case, State Farm, the Court further strengthened the constraints on
punitive damages.73 In a case for insurance bad faith arising out of the insurer’s
failure to settle a third-party liability claim, the jury awarded compensatory damages
of $1 million and punitive damages of $145 million. 74 Justice Kennedy, writing for
the Court, slightly clarified the Court’s second guidepost in BMW and stated that
“single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process.” 75 Based
largely upon the fact that the ratio was 145, the Court concluded that the punitive
damages award in State Farm was constitutionally infirm.76
62

Id. at 574-75.

63

Id. at 574.

64

Id. at 575.

65

Id. at 580.

66

Id. at 582.

67

Id. at 583.

68

Id. at 572.

69

Id. at 585-86.

70

Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 606 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

71

Id. at 607.

72

Id. at 605.

73

State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003).

74

Id. at 415.

75

Id. at 425.

76

Id. at 429.
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The Court, however, acknowledged that a higher multiple may be
constitutionally permissible depending upon the amount of compensatory damages. 77
Specifically, the Court stated, “The precise award in any case, of course, must be
based upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to
the plaintiff.”78
In State Farm, the Court also stated that punitive damages cannot punish a
defendant for “dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was
premised.”79 It went on to hold that due process “does not permit courts, in the
calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties’
hypothetical claims against a defendant.”80 This principle turned out to be a
foreshadowing of the main holding in Philip Morris, discussed below.81
D. Philip Morris (2007): Procedural Due Process
In 2007, three years after State Farm, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Philip Morris clarified the reprehensibility guidepost.82 This case involved an award
of some $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages
from litigation regarding the death of a heavy smoker in Oregon. 83 The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant cigarette manufacturer knowingly and falsely led him to
believe that smoking was safe.84 The corporate defendant, Philip Morris, mainly
argued that a portion of the $79.5 million punitive damages award “represented
punishment for its having harmed others.”85
The Court chose not to consider whether this award was grossly excessive. 86
Instead, it focused on whether punitive damages can be based in part upon a jury’s
desire to punish the defendant for harming nonparty victims. 87 The Court held that
such awards cannot punish the defendant for causing harm to individuals who are not
parties to the lawsuit and have their own tort claims against the defendant.88
Punishing the defendant for harm to nonparties violates the Due Process Clause for
two reasons. First, such punishment deprives the defendant of an opportunity to
defend itself against claims of injured nonparties. 89 Second, punishment for harm to
nonparties would “add a near standardless dimension to the punitive damages
77

Id. at 425.

78

Id.

79

Id. at 422-23.

80

Id. at 423.

81

Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007).

82

Id. at 357.

83

Id. at 349-50.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 351.

86

Id. at 353.

87

Id. at 354.

88

Id.

89

Id. at 353-54.
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equation,”90 if the calculation is based upon the amount of harmed nonparties, the
extent of their injuries, and the circumstances of those injuries. 91
Despite the above mentioned holding, the Court also noted that the jury may
consider the defendant’s conduct towards nonparties in determining reprehensibility,
as “harm to others shows more reprehensible conduct.” 92 In a nutshell, the main
result of Philip Morris is that trial courts must provide “some form of protection” to
ensure that the jury considers the evidence of harm to people other than the plaintiff
when evaluating the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, but the jury should
not consider this information when assessing the amount of punitive damages that
might be awarded.93
E. Exxon (2008): One to One Ratio Rule
In the Exxon decision,94 the U.S. Supreme Court finally settled the disputes over
the unprecedented environmental disaster in 1989 involving the Exxon Valdez and at
the same time addressed a challenge to the punitive damages award by establishing
the “one to one ratio rule.”95 The corporate defendant, Exxon Shipping Co., was
allegedly reckless in allowing a known alcoholic to captain a tanker carrying crude
oil. The captain caused one of the greatest accidents ever, spilling eleven million
gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound.96 In the specific mandatory class
action mainly brought by commercial fishermen for lost profits, the jury awarded
$287 million in compensatory damages and $5 billion (later reduced to $2.5 billion)
in punitive damages against the defendant.97
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, began his discussion of the punitive
damages award by holding that the case “goes to our understanding of the place of
punishment in modern civil law and reasonable standards of process in administering
punitive law.”98 After reviewing the history of punitive damages, the Court declared,
“The real problem, it seems, is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards.” 99 It

90

Id. at 354.

91

Id.

92

Id. at 355.

93

Id. at 357. In most cases, however, it is evidently hard for a jury to make this
distinction. For example, Justice Stevens points out the problem with regard to the difference
between reprehensibility and punishing for harm caused to nonparties: “When a jury increases
a punitive damages award because injuries to third parties enhanced the reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct, the jury is by definition punishing the defendant . . . for third party
harm.” Id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008).

95

Id.

96

Id. at 478-79.

97

Id. at 480-81.

98

Id. at 490.

99

Id. at 499.
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illustrated two cases with “strikingly similar facts,” 100 where one jury awarded the
plaintiff $4 million in punitive damages and the other awarded the plaintiff none. 101
The Court expressed skepticism that verbal formulations could work to promote
“systematic consistency.”102 To better achieve predictability, it suggested that the
fact finder “peg punitive to compensatory damages using a ratio or maximum
multiple.”103 The amount of the multiplier should be based on the level of
“blameworthiness within the punishable spectrum” 104 and the amount of
compensatory damages.105 If the amount is substantial, a lesser ratio is appropriate. If
the amount is modest or the odds of detecting the harm are minimal, a higher ratio is
appropriate.106 Heavily relying upon empirical scholarly studies, including Professor
Eisenberg’s thesis,107 the Court determined that a one-to-one ratio was appropriate in
the Exxon case due to mere recklessness of the conduct and the substantial
compensatory award.108
As Exxon was decided under the principles of maritime law, its scope seems to
be limited. Furthermore, because it was a common law-based challenge, its
expressed concern for predictability is not binding on the states, and Congress could
potentially abrogate the holding with legislation. Some lower courts, however, have
already begun to incorporate Exxon’s concern for predictability within the
constitutional analysis of punitive damages. 109
F. This Article’s Contribution to an Understanding of Punitive Damages Awards
While most of the prior empirical literature, which mainly deals with state trial
court decisions, is helpful for understanding the realities of punitive damages at the
state or trial level, the more illuminating questions involve the decisions of federal
appellate courts. This article, specifically exploring the impact of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decisions on federal circuit courts, provides a new perspective on how
judges see the punitive damages regime within the U.S. Supreme Court’s
framework. This is because circuit court judges are more likely than trial judges to
hew to the Supreme Court’s holdings.
This study also empirically clarifies the differences in impact of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decisions on lower courts. Conventional or traditional legal studies
tend to look into the texts of the Court’s decisions and the backgrounds of those
cases. Our data, on the other hand, attempts to explore whether or not the U.S.
100

Id. at 500.

101

Id.

102

Id. at 504.

103

Id. at 506.

104

Id. at 512-13.

105

Id.

106

Id. at 513.

107

Id. at 497; see also Eisenberg et al., Empirical Study, supra note 22.

108

Exxon, 554 U.S. at 513.

109 See, e.g., James Crystal Licenses, LLC v. Infinity Radio Inc., 43 So.3d 68, 79 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (stating that a case where the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
equals fifty-five could hardly be reasonably predictable).
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Supreme Court doctrine functions as a proxy for shifts in appellate court behavior, as
demonstrated by empirical evidence. Hence, our findings may provide a more
multidimensional perspective on the Court’s holdings.
III. DATA AND MAIN RESULTS
A. The Data Used in This Study
The data for this study, covering the last eight years (from November 1, 2004, to
October 31, 2012), comes from the Lexis-Nexis Academic database. After a cursory
reading of 1,115 federal circuit court cases, gathered by the key words “punitive
damages” as legal terms, 318 (28.5%) of those cases were ones in which punitive
damage awards had been granted (most of which were by federal district courts). 110
The remaining 797 (71.5%) cases were ones in which the plaintiffs did not prevail,
were awarded compensatory damages only, or ones which have little relevance to
this study, despite judicial reference to punitive damages in written decisions. 111
B. The Punitive to Compensatory Damages Ratio
Table 1 shows the median and mean of punitive and compensatory awards
granted in cases with punitive damages awards, as well as the punitive to
compensatory damages ratio. Because there are fifteen cases where the adjudicators
(jury or judge) awarded $0 in compensatory damages, the number of the ratio is 303.
The difference between mean and median is glaring and striking, especially with
regard to punitive damages awarded. The amount of the mean punitive damages is
$493,195,929,112 while the amount of median is $500,000,113 which seems mediocre.
The same holds true for the punitive to compensatory damages ratio. The reason why
the mean punitive damages award or ratio is extremely high is simple: several
outliers, such as the $5 billion punitive award in In re Exxon Valdez,114 tend to inflate
the mean. When focusing solely on the mean award amount, it might safely be said
that punitive damages are unpredictable and continue to “run wild,” as a number of
tort reformers assert.
However, what is important when gauging punitive awards is not mean, but
rather median, because the latter outweighs the former in that it could exclude the
impact of outliers.
Now, let us examine the median punitive to compensatory damages ratio.
Although the median 2.11 seems relatively higher than 0.62115 or 0.67116 in the prior
literatures, it is not considerably high, given that all the cases in this study are from
110

Hironari Momioka, Data Set Composed of 318 Cases to Assess Punitive Damages (on
file with the author) [hereinafter Momioka, Data Set].
111

Id.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1066 (D. Alaska 2002).

115

Eisenberg & Heise, Judge-Jury Difference, supra note 22, at 331 Tbl.1.

116 Neil Vidmar & M.R. Rose, Punitive Damages by Juries in Florida: In Theory and in
Reality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 492-94 (2001). The authors point out, however, that there
is substantial variability across case types. See id.
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federal circuit courts. At that level of court, it is understandable that in almost all the
cases the punitive damages amounts awarded were fairly large for the defendants. In
that respect, we can say that the median ratio calculated in our study does not
contradict, but instead supports, precedent studies.
Table 1: Median and Mean Punitive and Compensatory Awards, 2004-2012
Punitive Award
Compensatory
Award
Punitive to
Compensatory
Ratio

Median
500,00

Mean
493,195,929

N
318

250,163

17,117,135

318

2.11

8775.16

303

Note: The data covers the time from November 1, 2004 to October 31, 2012.
When calculating the ratio, 15 cases have been excluded where the plaintiff won
a zero compensatory award (ratio incalculable)
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database
C. Judge-Jury Differences
We next compare jury awards with awards ordered by judges sitting alone,
focusing on the ratio of punitive to compensatory awards. A ratio is, as discussed in
Section II, described by quite a few scholars and in the Supreme Court decisions as
an important “barometer of whether a punitive damages award is out of line.” 117
Table 2 reports by adjudicator, the medians, the means, their significances of
difference, and the numbers of observations.
The Table’s last column shows the observations. Litigants chose jury trials at an
overwhelmingly higher rate than trial by judge alone. The rate at which litigants (a
plaintiff, a defendant, or both) chose jury trials was 83.82%, though fifteen cases in
which the compensatory awards were zero have been excluded for ease of
calculation.118 The result demonstrates that litigants’ preference for jury trials in
federal courts is almost the same as in the state courts. At the state court level, the
rate at which litigants chose jury trials was 81.26%, in cases where both punitive and
compensatory damages were awarded.119
The third column indicates medians. The judge-jury difference between 1.37 and
2.43 seems outstanding but is not statistically significant (a significant level is 5%),
as shown in the fourth column. 120 It is only in punitive damages awards that
adjudicator difference shows a high statistical significance. According to the fifth
and sixth columns, all means, including punitive to compensatory ratio, indicate no
statistical difference. Thus, one could conclude that there seems to be no difference
in assessing damages, as between jury and judge, as far as the cases before the
117

Hersch & Viscusi, Perform, supra note 24, at 8-9.

118

Momioka, Data Set, supra note 110, at Tbl.2.

119

438 jury trials and 101 bench trials, according to the data from Civil Justice Survey of
State Courts 1992-2001. See Theordore Eisenberg et al., Judges, Juries, and Punitive
Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and
2001 Data, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 269 Tbl.1 (2006).
120

Momioka, Data Set, supra note 110, at Tbl.2.
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federal appellate courts are concerned. It is also noteworthy that both the median
ratios are far below the standard held in State Farm (“single digit”—that is, less than
10 times).121
Table 2: Median and Mean Punitive and Compensatory Awards, by Adjudicator

Punitive Award

Adjudicator

Median

Jury

503,424

Significance
of
Adjudicator
Difference
0.0034**

Compensatory
Award

Punitive to
Compensatory
Ratio

Judge

200,000

Jury

3000,00
0.4691

Judge

214,000

Jury

2.43

Judge

1.37

0.0581

Mean
493,19
5,929
600,21
4,885
17,117,
135
4,959,1
79
10456.
15

Significance
of
Adjudicator
Difference

N

254
0.3756
49
254
0.1795
49

0.1931

61.41

254
49

Note: **p<0.01. The significance mean difference is based upon a MannWhitney test; the significance mean difference is based upon a t-test.
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database
Figure 1 is a scatter-plot of logged punitive and compensatory damages with jury
and judge trials from our data.122 In this figure, logarithmic scales are employed,
since linear scales and untransformed data often fail to clarify the relations between
the variables. Using logged data is a proper and valid method 123 when dealing with
damages, inter alia, punitive awards, because they are quite rarely normally
distributed and could hardly assume standard regression. The best fitting regression
lines for jury and judge trials also appear there. Intuitively, we can find that these
two lines are similar in light of gradient and intercept.

121

Id.; State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).

122

Momioka, Data Set, supra note 110, at Fig.1.

123 For validity of using logarithmic scales, see generally ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER
HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 59-65
(2007).
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Figure 1: Punitive to compensatory Awards (logs) by Adjudicator

Figure 1: Punitive to Compensatory Awards (logs) by Adjudicator
12
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Punitive (log10)

judge
jury

8

6

4

jury
judge

2

0
0

1

2

3

4
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6

7

8

9

10

Compensatory (log10)

Note: Lines are the best-fitting linear regression lines for jury and judge trials.
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database.
Table 3 shows the ratios of logged transformed punitive to compensatory
damages awards. As the third and fifth columns indicate, there is no significant
difference between a jury or judge as adjudicators in both median and mean. 124 To
put it another way, juries and judges perform almost the same when assessing
damages. Furthermore, these findings are generally in harmony with prior studies. 125
Table 3: Ratio of Logged Punitive to Compensatory Awards, by Adjudicator
Significance
Significance
of
of
Adjudicator
Median
Mean
N
Adjudicator
Adjudicator
Difference
Difference
Jury
1.0061
1.2079
254
0.1059
0.2162
Judge
1.0268
1.1133
49
Note: The significance median difference is based upon a Mann-Whitney test;
the significance mean difference is based upon a t-test.
Data Source: Lexis Nexis
D. Case Category, Case Types, Party Status, and Locale
This Section mainly explores the ratios of logged punitive to compensatory
damages by case category, party status, and locale. Table 4 summarizes the number
and percentage of jury and judge trial characteristics, and the second and third
columns show the number of jury and judge-only trials, respectively.
124

Momioka, Data Set, supra note 110, at Tbl.3.

125 See, e.g., Eisenberg et al., Empirical Study, supra note 22; Eisenberg, Variability in
Punitive Damages, supra note 22, at 13; see also Hersch & Viscusi, Perform, supra note 24,
at 36 (highlighting the judge-jury difference in assessing the punitive awards).
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As the rows of “Case Category” and “Case Types” in Table 4 illustrate, nearly
one-half (49.1%) of the punitive damages cases involve civil rights, such as 42 U.S.
§ 1983 (torts by federal or state government officials), 126 42 U.S. § 1981
(employment discrimination or dispute),127 and Americans Disabilities Act (ADA). 128
This trend is strikingly different from state courts.129 Juries see a disproportionate
number of civil rights cases; of the 156 civil rights cases, 146 (93.6%) were jury
trials.130
As for the row of “Case Types,” we categorize each case to only one type though
disputes could involve more than one claim, and there could be an overlap across the
claim types. Notably, the combined number of § 1981 and § 1983 litigations alone
account for as much as 39.4%.131 Also notable is that jury trials dominate those
punitive damages cases (92.0%).132 The second largest portion belongs to business
torts cases, which include insurance, malpractice, copyright infringement, product
liability, and so forth.133
As the “Party Status” column indicates, we categorize all of the punitive
damages cases into four groups. For those cases that involve multiple plaintiff or
defendant types, cases are categorized based on the importance of each litigant. In
more than one-half of the cases (64.2%), the plaintiff was an individual, and the
defendant was a non-individual, such as a corporation, hospital, or government.134
Furthermore, most of the cases were decided by a jury. The results illustrate the
popular and typical lore that individual victims can bring lawsuits against big
companies with deep pockets and be awarded huge punitive damages through jury
verdicts.
The distribution of jury-judge punitive damages awards cases, by locale, varies
considerably. Almost all punitive damages cases were tried by juries in one region
(Fourth Circuit),135 while judge-only trials accounted for 25.6% in another region
(Ninth Circuit).136

126

Momioka, Data Set, supra note 110, at Tbl.4.

127

Id.

128

Id.

129

See, e.g., Eisenberg & Heise, Judge-Jury Difference, supra note 22, at 333 Tbl.2.

130

Momioka, Data Set, supra note 110, at Tbl.4.

131

Id.

132

Id.

133

Id.

134

Id.

135

Id.

136

Id.
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Table 4: Summary of Jury and Judge Trial Characteristics in Punitive Damages
Cases
Jury

Judge

Percent of Total
Cases

10
22
22

49.1
35.2
15.7

Case Category
Civil Rights
Business Torts
Others

146
90
28

§1983
Employment
Discrimination or
Dispute
Insurance
Financial Dispute
Copyrights
Product Liability
Defamation and
Privacy
Other Torts
Contract
Bankruptcy
Others

60

6

20.8

55

4

18.6

20
12
3
6

2
5
1
1

6.9
5.3
1.3
2.2

6

3

2.8

72
20
0
10

12
8
8
4

26.4
8.8
2.5
4.4

32

12

13.8

180

24

64.2

4

5

2.8

48

13

19.2

2

1

0.9

20
15
26
18
21
31

2
4
2
1
7
8

6.9
6.0
8.8
6.0
8.8
12.3

Case Types

Party Status
Individual Plaintiff
v. Individual
Defendant
Individual Plaintiff
v. Non-Individual
Defendant
Non-Individual
Plaintiff v.
Individual
Defendant
Non-Individual
Plaintiff v. NonIndividual
Defendant

Locale
Circuit of District of
Columbia
1st Circuit
2nd Circuit
3rd Circuit
4th Circuit
5th Circuit
6th Circuit
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7th Circuit
8th Circuit
9th Circuit
10th Circuit
11th Circuit
N

21
29
32
29
20
264

397

5
7
11
3
3
54

8.2
11.3
13.5
10.1
7.2

Note: Total Cases, N = 318.
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database.
1. Case Category
Figure 2 explores the relationship between compensatory and punitive awards by
case category. It illustrates a general pattern of awarding punitive damages: the
business torts regression line is steeper than the civil rights line, indicating that juries
or judges tend to award greater punitive damages in business disputes than in civil
rights cases.
Figure 2: Punitive to Compensatory Awards (logs) by Case Category
Figure 2: Punitive to Compensatory Awards (logs) by Case Category
12

Punitive (log10)

10

8

Business Torts

6

Civil Rights

Business Torts
Civil Rights

4

2

0
0

2

4

6

8

10

Compensatory (log10)

2. Litigant Type
Although party status was categorized into four groups in Table 4, we focus
solely on cases involving two types of defendants (individual and non-individual)
here to facilitate comparisons. The exploration will also provide us with insight into
the relationship between the defendant’s wealth and the amount of punitive damages
awarded.
As displayed in Table 5, almost all differences between individual and nonindividual defendants are not statistically significant. There is, however, one
exception (median of punitive award), suggesting that non-individual defendants
such as wealthy companies have to pay large amounts of punitive damages. It is also
noteworthy that the average of compensatory awards for individual parties is larger
than that for non-individual parties, and the average of punitive damages awards for
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individuals is smaller than that for non-individuals, though the difference is not
significant in either case.
Table 5: Median and Mean Punitive and Compensatory Awards, by Status of
Defendant

Punitive
Award

Compensatory
Award
Punitive to
Compensatory
Ratio

Status of
Defendant

Median

Individual

250,000

NonIndividual

500,000

Individual

213,000

NonIndividual
Individual
NonIndividual

Significance
of Status
Difference

Mean
44,423,572

0.0249***

610,812,855

300,00

53
265

2,557.15
0.8499

265

0.5059
13,397,682

2.05

N
53

0.3260

40,267,362
0.2235

2.13

Significance
of Status
Difference

10,033.57

53
0.367

265

Note: ***p<0.005. The significance median difference is based upon a MannWhitney test; the significnce mean difference is based upon a t-test.
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database
E. The Supreme Court Decisions and Circuit Court Judges
A concern in using data spanning eight years is whether the circuit court judges
have hewed to or stayed current with the U.S. Supreme Court decisions, such as
Philip Morris or Exxon, when it comes to dealing with the punitive awards cases
before them. It seems self-evident that lower courts follow what the U.S. Supreme
Court holds because case law, based upon the doctrine of stare decisis, rather than
statutory law, dominates or rules in the Anglo-American legal system.137
However, according to the results of this study, it is not the case that stare decisis
dominates where the punitive damages regime is concerned. This Section attempts to
show that the impact of U.S. Supreme Court decisions on federal circuit courts is
mixed at best.
1. Punitive Damages over Time: Ratio by Year
Table 6 represents the result of medians of punitive to compensatory ratios and
punitive and compensatory awards by year. As a whole, the ratio seems stable.
Taking a close look at the changes of ratios by year, however, it is true that the ratio
dropped in 2009, 2010, and 2011, shortly after Exxon.138 What is beyond
comprehension is that, as illuminated in Figure 3, there was a sudden increase in the
ratio in 2012.139 It is also not clear why the median ratio in 2008 is as high as 3.33,
which exceeds all the other years.140 All trends considered, the ups and downs seem
137

Id. at Tbl.5.

138

Id. at Tbl.6.

139

Id. at Fig.3.

140

Id. at Tbl.7.
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inexplicable and unrelated to the U.S. Supreme Court decisions, as the reasoning in
Philip Morris and Exxon cannot explain the ratio trend completely. In other words, if
the U.S. Supreme Court’s intention to curb the level of damages awarded had
functioned, the ratio should have decreased.
Despite the foregoing, we cannot totally exclude the possibility that the two
decisions might have restrained punitive damages awards. An analysis of the ratio
change alone does not provide insight into the impact of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions on the federal circuit court punitive damages regime.
Table 6: Punitive to Compensatory Ratio By Year
Year
Median
Punitive to
Compensatory
Ratio
Median
Punitive
Awards
Median
Compensatory
Awards
Number of
Cases

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2.81

2.15

1.76

2.43

3.33

2.00

1.67

1.91

3.17

331,250

500,00

200,000

930,000

472,300

550,00

503,424

750,000

350,000

75,00

2877,736

255,000

291,000

106,000

304,000

282,853

486,932

350,000

7

52

43

47

41

40

34

25

29

Note: Year of 2004 ranges from November 1 to December 13, Year of 2012
ranges from Janurary 1 to October 31, and the rest range from Janurary 1 to
December 31
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database
Figure 3:Median Punitive to Compensatory Ratio
Figure 3: Median Punitive to Compensatory Ratio
3.33

3.17

2.81
2.43
2.15

2.00
1.76
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1.91
1.67
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2. Punitive Damages over Time: Ratio by Period
In that regard, we undertake two kinds of data analysis, dividing the eight-year
period into two parts: pre/post Philip Morris and pre/post Exxon.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017

21

400

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:379

Table 7 shows the data of the impact of Philip Morris on federal circuit courts.
The untransformed median has slightly risen (from 2.00 to 2.32), 141 which seems to
be contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s intention. Statistically speaking, its attempt
to restrict the ratio may not have been fully accomplished. Yet, as the third column
indicates, the change of median is insignificant. The slight rises of logged median
and mean are also insignificant.
Table7: Ratio of Punitive to Compensatory Awards, pre/post Phillip Morris
(2007)

Period

Untransformed
Median

PrePhillip
Morris
PostPhillip
Morris

Significance
of pre/post
Phillip
Morris
Difference

2.00

N

Logged
Median

Significance
of pre/post
Phillip
Morris
Difference

107

1.0576

0.4462

Logged
Mean

1.0957

0.3533
2.32

Significance
of pre/post
Phillip
Morris
Difference

N

105
0.5150

196

1.0639

1.1284

1.1284

192

Note: The data covers the time period from November 1, 2004 to October 31,
2012. “Logged” stands for log (10). When calculating logged median and mean,
six cases have been excluded, where logged compensatory damages are zero
(ratio incalculable.) The significance median difference is based upon a MannWhitney test; the significance mean difference is based upon a t-test.
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database
Likewise, Table 8 shows the influence of Exxon on lower courts. As opposed to
Philip Morris, the median (untransformed) dropped from 2.30 to 2.00 after Exxon,142
which seems to indicate a change for the better as the U.S. Supreme Court has hoped
for years. The slight decline, however, is not statistically significant. Although the
logged means do marginally differ, logged medians do not show a significant
difference (p=0.5150<0.10).143
To put it briefly, what Tables 7 and 8 suggest is quite simple and obvious: neither
Philip Morris nor Exxon changed the attitudes of lower federal circuit courts toward
the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. These results are precisely the
opposite of what was predicted.

141

Id. at Tbl.8.

142

Id. at Tbl.8. n.1.

143

Id.
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Table 8: Ratio of Punitive to Compensatory Awards, pre/post Exxon (2008)

Period

Untransformed
Median

PreExxon

2.30

Significance
of pre/post
Exxon
Difference

N

Logged
Median

163

1.0662

0.6181
PostExxon

2.00

Significance
of pre/post
Exxon
Difference

Logged
Mean

1.1628
0.4578

140

Significance
of pre/post
Difference

1.0525

N

161
0.591****

1.0625

136

Note: The data covers the time period November 1, 2004 to October 31, 2012.
“Logged” stands for log (10.) When calculating logged median and mean, six cases
have been excluded, where logged compensatory damages are zero (ratio
incalculable.) The significance median difference is based upon a Mann-Whitney
test; the significance mean difference is based upon a t-test. ****Difference pre/post
Exxon is significant at p<0.10.
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database.
3. Reduced Damages (Remittitur)
Trial judges are entitled to reduce the amount of damages, including punitive
damages, within their discretion if they believe that granted awards are improper.
This power is called “remittitur.”144 When a defendant agrees to a proposed amount,
a judge can enter the judgment. In practice, district judges frequently use this
procedure when awarding punitive damages.145 This Section explores the impact of
the Exxon decision on damage reductions. Here, we will examine whether judges
have demonstrated a tendency to reduce the amount of awards more after Exxon, as
opposed to before the decision.
Out of 318 cases, we found sixty-seven cases in which punitive damages awards
were reduced.146 In most cases, trial judges reduced punitive damages awards
granted by juries (remittitur) in prior proceedings. However, there were also two
cases in which punitive damages awards resulting from judge-only trials were
reduced. The fact that only 21.07% (67/318) of the cases resulted in an award

144

See generally LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 443-51 (6th ed. 2010). On the
contrary, trial judges are also entitled to raise the damages if they believe an amount of
damages is too small. This procedure is called additur. See David Baldus et al., Improving
Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative
Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80
IOWA L. REV. 1109, 1119 (1995). None of the trials in this study involve additur.
145

As one court correctly stated, “Remittitur plays an important role in judicial economy
by encouraging an end to litigation rather than a new trial.” Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp.,
715 N.E.2d 546, 556 (Ohio 1999).
146

Momioka, Data Set, supra note 110.
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reduction might suggest that trial or circuit court judges tend to show deference to
the conclusions of fact finders like juries and trial court judges.
Table 9 indicates the result of punitive award reductions. In this section, the
increasing rate stands for the rate of the latter to the former value minus one. For
example, if the amount of the pre-Exxon punitive award was 500,000, and the postExxon award 120,000, the increasing rate equals 1-120,000/500,000—namely, 76.00% (decreasing rate: 76%).147
With regard to medians and means of the decreasing rate, the period after the
Exxon decision shows a drop (17.34% and 14.84%, respectively). Each indicator
strikingly demonstrates a statistically significant difference. The result evidently
suggests that after the Exxon decision, lower court judges tend to limit punitive
damages awards much more than before the case was decided. Although it is not
apparent that Exxon is the only dominant reason for the decrease in the level of
punitive awards, it is true that both the median and mean indicate a drop after 2008.
The drop in numbers after 2008 also suggests a difference in terms of the
decision’s influence on juries and judges. It is quite natural and understandable that
trial and circuit court judges, as experienced repeat-players, are more or less aware
of U.S. Supreme Court decisions and have an intrinsic incentive to adhere to legal
doctrines; on the other hand, less experienced lay juries, as one-time players, do not
have to be well-informed of jurisprudence. The result of this study comports with the
Eisenberg’s finding that “in general, court decisions—including many (but not all)
Supreme Court decisions—tend to be absorbed and propagated by judges more
directly than by lay jurors.”148
Table 9: Increasing Rate of Punitive Awards, pre/post Exxon (2008), Cases with
Reduction
Significance
Significance
Median
of pre/post
Mean
of pre/post
Period
N
(%)
Exxon
(%)
Exxon
Difference
Difference
Pre-65.53
-54.16
33
Exxon
0.0127*****
0.0340*****
Post82.87
-69.00
37
Exxon
Note: The data covers the time period from November 1, 2004 to October 31, 2012.
*****p<0.05. The significance median difference is based upon a Mann-Whitney
test; the significance mean difference is based upon a t-test.
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database
Returning to the subject of ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, a
statistically significant change has not been observed. As stated above, the ratio is
the one that the Court believes to be a pivotal criterion or a guiding principle to
decide whether the amount of punitive damages awarded is constitutional. That is the
reason why we ought to examine it here.
In this section, the increasing rate means the rate of the latter to the former ratio
minus one. As an illustration, if the ratio of pre-Exxon punitive to compensatory
147

See, e.g., Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 563 F.3d 357, 363 (8th Cir. 2009).

148

Eisenberg & Heise, Judge-Jury Difference, supra note 22, at 348.
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awards is 13.29 and post-Exxon it is 3.57, the increasing rate equals 1-3.57/13.29—
namely, -73.12% (decreasing rate: 73.12%).149
As shown in Table 10, the median of the increasing rate of ratio seems to have
dropped by as much as 17.09%. However, using a Mann-Whitney test, the difference
is not statistically significant (p=0.2083), which implies that the Exxon decision did
not radically affect the decreasing rate of ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
for cases involving remittitur.
According to these results, one may say that while Exxon has succeeded in
curbing the level of punitive damages to the point where a statistically significant
difference has been seen, the ratio is still not within a reasonable range as far as the
federal circuit courts are concerned.
In that regard, employing the ratio as a pivotal guiding principle of
constitutionality of the punitive awards might be questionable. We will discuss this
concept further below.
Table 10: Increasing Rate of Ratio of Punitive to Compensatory Awards, pre/post
Exxon (2008) for Cases with Reduction
Period

Median (%)

Significance of
pre/post Exxon
Difference

N

Pre-Exxon
Post-Exxon

-58.73
-75.82

0.2083

31
36

Note: The data covers the time period from November 1, 2004 to October 31,
2012. Three cases have been excluded where compensatory damages are zerio
(ratio incalculable.) The significance median difference is based upon a MannWhitney test.
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database
F. Stratifying the Punitive to Compensatory Ratio
As pointed out in Section II.E, one of the factors that led the U.S. Supreme Court
astray is having grouped the cases with low and high compensatory damages
together. That is what Eisenberg and his coauthors correctly clarified by stratifying
the level of compensatory awards in the data sets that the Court relied on in Exxon.150
In this Section, we explore, using our gathered data, whether or not high
compensatory damage cases are different from low ones in the same way as
Eisenberg did.
Table 11 shows the result of median, mean, and standard deviation of punitive to
compensatory damages ratio, across compensatory award ranges divided into seven
layers. It is striking that all three indicators (i.e., median, mean, and standard
deviation) decrease as compensatory damages increase. Notably, as for the cases
with compensatory awards equal to or more than $100,000, the median is quite
stable at below 2.00. Likewise, the mean or the standard deviation dramatically falls
off, with an exception for the penultimate numerical row of the Table. That is solely
because the range includes just one case whose ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages is extremely high at as much as 11,417.32.151 The numbers in parentheses
149

In re Rountree, 478 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 2007).

150

Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive Damages, supra note 22, at 17-20.

151

Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1327 (11th Cir. 2010).
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are those calculated with the exclusion of the outlier. One can see a pattern of
decline clearly within these numbers.
The penultimate column in the Table indicates the number of cases with ratios
equal to or greater than 10, showing that only 63 out of 303 cases resulting in a
punitive damages award have ratios exceeding a single digit—which the Court
suggests will hardly, “to a significant degree[,] . . . satisfy due process” in the State
Farm decision.152 The column also indicates that the rate of cases with ratios over 10
drops dramatically at the very high levels of compensatory awards granted.
Table 11: Stratifying the Punitive to Compensatory Ratio by Size of the
Compensatory Award

Compensatory
Award Range

$k to 999
$1k to $9,999
$10k to
$99,999
$100k to
$999,999
$1m to
$9,999,999
$10 m to
$99,999,999
$100m or
greater

Median
Punitive to
Compensatory
Ratio

Mean Punitive
to
Compensatory
Ratio

Punitive to
Compensatory
Ratio
Standard
Deviation

5,000.00
30.21

203,356.89
95.77

545,213.79
222.16

Number
of Cases
with
Ratios
Greater
than
Single
Digit
11
10

3.49

8.55

18.78

19

74

1.63

12.59

40.16

12

117

1.51

4.89

12.98

9

66

1.00

674.27 (2.83)

2,768.452
(4.52)

2

17
(16)

1.00

1.00

0.00

0

2

N

13
14

Note: k = 1000; m = 1,000,000. The data covers the period from November 1,
2004 to October 31, 2012.
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database
From a statistical viewpoint, one can examine the difference of median, mean,
and standard deviation across large and small compensatory awards. As Table 12
illustrates, the null hypotheses that median and standard deviation for cases with
compensatory awards less than $10,000 are the same as those for cases with
compensatory awards of $10,000 and more have been rejected. In other words, a
statistically significant difference within two groups is observed with regard to both
the median and standard deviation of ratio (p<0.001), although the mean does not
achieve a statistical significance for some reason or another (p=0.19).
So far, we have seen that the patterns of ratios are so different across ranges that
we need to pay close attention to the level of compensatory awards when discussing
the constitutionality of the punitive awards. The risk of an underlying inconsistency
attends the Court’s holding in Exxon, as can be seen in the following quotation:
152

See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
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“[M]aking policy or doctrine based on grouping high and low compensatory cases
together is questionable.”153
Table 12: Test of the Hypotheses that Median, Mean, and Standard Deviation for
Cases with Compensatory Awards Less than $10,000 Equal those for Cases with
$10,000 or More

Compensatory
Award Range

Median
Punitive to
Compensatory
Ratio

Mean Punitive
to
Compensatory
Ratio

Punitive
Compensatory
Ratio Standard
Deviation

$1 to 9,999

81.30

97,962.24

384,587.28

Number
of Cases
with
Ratios
Greater
than
Single
Digit
21

$10,000 or
greater

1.23

50.33

687.30

42

N

27
276

Note: The data covers the time period from November 1, 2004 to October 31, 2012.
**Difference between low and high compensatory awards is significant at p<0.001.
G. Federal Circuit Court and Punitive Damages
In this Section, we focus on federal circuit court judges’ decisions regarding
punitive damages awards. When reviewing the facts of the case and deciding to
affirm or deny (vacate, reverse, and/or remand) the punitive damages awarded by a
jury or trial judge, what factors or elements do circuit court judges take into
consideration? Answering this question could clarify the relation between the U.S.
Supreme Court decisions and those of federal circuit courts.
From the perspectives of the U.S. Supreme Court’s doctrines, such as Gore’s
three-pronged guideline, the single digit rule in State Farm, or the one-to-one rule in
Exxon, it seems more likely that the punitive to compensatory ratio, rather than
amounts of punitive awards, dominates the reasoning in federal circuit court
decisions. Examining this issue is not only rewarding and worthwhile, but also
feasible and practical when it comes to adopting a statistical evaluative approach.
1. Federal Circuit Court Judges’ Decisions to Affirm or Deny Awarded Punitive
Damages
Table 13 shows the results of median punitive damages awarded and ratio by
decision. Broadly speaking, federal circuit court judges tend to negate, rather than
declare valid, more punitive damages awards. Furthermore, as one would naturally
predict, the difference between affirmation and denial is highly statistically
significant in all medians. It is noteworthy that the most pronounced finding in this
Table is the gap of median ratio across decisions. Therefore, it seems plausible that
circuit court judges are more likely to negate the punitive damages award in cases
where the ratio exceeds three, as opposed to when it falls below three.
However, we cannot conclude that the ratio is the only influential element of the
equation that judges consider when reviewing the constitutionality of the award.
There is, thus, a need for an additional analytical approach in order to examine a
153

Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive Damages, supra note 22, at 20.
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cause-and-effect relationship between a court’s decision and factors, such as ratio,
amount of the punitive damages award, case category, and so on.
Table 13: Median Punitive Award and Ratio, by Federal Circuit Court’s
Decisions
Decision

Median Punitive
Award
(untransformed)

Affirmation
Denial

268,000
1,006,333******

Median
Punitive
Award (log
10)
5.4279
6.0027******

N
200
118

Median Ratio
of
Compensatory
Award
1.82
3.06******

N
189
114

Note: The data covers the time period from November 1, 2004 to October 31,
2012. Fifteen cases have been excluded where compensatory damages are zero
(ratio incalculable.) The significance median difference is based upon a MannWhitney test. ******decision difference is significant at p<0.01.
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database
2. Logistic Regression Models of Whether or Not Awarded Punitive Damages Were
Affirmed
Although we are not privy to the process behind all high courts’ holdings,
logistic regression models enable us to know judges’ overall tendencies when
determining the constitutionality of punitive damages awards.
Because the dependent variable in a model of the decision to affirm the awarded
punitive damages is dichotomous, we have employed logistic regression models,
which are commonly used when analyzing the risk factors in various research fields,
including epidemiological surveys. In this study, using logistic regression models
helps us understand the degree and significance of each factor’s effects on the
outcome.154
Table 14 reports the results of logistic regression analyses that explore the effects
of logged punitive damages awards (log 10), logged ratio of punitive to
compensatory awards (log natural), dummied jury trial, party status, and case
category. We added elements such as a jury’s participation to examine higher court
judges’ prejudice against fact-finders, a party’s status to explore the relationship
between defendant’s wealth and the decision, and case category to test the link
between wrongdoers’ reprehensibility and the outcome.
In both Models 1 & 2, the coefficient on the punitive damages award variable is
considerably large and highly statistically significant. Moreover, the values on each
coefficient are all negative, meaning that the more punitive damages awarded, the
less likely a higher court is to affirm the amount awarded.
Other factors, including ratio, show no significance, despite our predictions to the
contrary. Elements other than the size of the punitive damages award (log 10) have
little or no impact on decisions.
To summarize, it is neither ratio nor case category but the amount of punitive
damages in its own right that determines the constitutionality of the award. That is,
the sum of the punitive damages awarded has the most powerful impact on the high
courts’ decisions to affirm or negate the award. It is noteworthy that ratio, one of the
154 For an understanding of logistic regression, see generally DAVID W. HOSMER &
STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION (2d ed. 2000).
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most reliable and promising guideposts rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court, is not a
statistically significant factor, suggesting that circuit court judges do not rely on the
ratio when deciding whether the punitive damages violate the due process of law. 155
Therefore, we can safely say that U.S. Supreme Court holdings do not function as
the key criteria. Instead, circuit court judges do not follow the Court’s rationale
regarding the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages.
Table 14: Logistic Regression Models of Whether Awarded Punitive Damages
Were Affirmed by the Appellate Courts

Punitive Award (log 10)
Ratio of Punitive to
Compensatory Awards
(log natural)
Jury Trial Dummy
Party Status
Individual v. NonIndividual
Non-Individual v. Nonindividual
Case Category
Civil Rights
Business Torts
Constant
N

Model 1
Model 2
Dependent Variable = Punitive Damages Affirmed
-0.3829*******
0.4809*******
-0.0958

-0.0810

-0.4849

-0.2790

-0.0715

-------

-0.1704

-------

0.5940
0.2406
2.9631 *******
303

------------3.6362*******
303

Note: The data covers the time period from November 1, 2004 to October 31,
2012. Fifteen cases out of 318 have been excluded where the plaintiff won a zero
compensatory award (ratio incalculable.) *******p<0.01.
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Key Findings
Our current study attempted to examine the impact of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions concerning punitive damages on lower courts using 318 federal circuit
court decisions.156 We obtained the following five main results.
One key finding is that, as is shown in prior studies, there is no difference
between decisions made by juries or judges when assessing damages. Conventional
wisdom used to be that juries are so passionate about outrageous conduct by
defendants that they frequently tend to award huge punitive damages against large
companies; therefore, the jury system is the main culprit of the current tort law crisis.
This study confirms the opposite in the way of federal circuit court cases. That is,
juries award damages in the same way as judges sitting alone.
A second important finding is the surprising stability of the ratio before and after
Philip Morris and Exxon.157 Contrary to our prediction, this exploration established
155

See infra Tbl.14.

156

Momioka, Data Set, supra note 110.
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that those two decisions have not changed the proportionality between punitive to
compensatory awards.158 Given that in most cases the fact-finder is a jury, there is an
implication that the juries remain unaffected by U.S. Supreme Court decisions, at
least with respect to punitive damages. 159
A third finding of great interest is about decreasing rates after remittitur of
awards granted by trial court judges. A statistical analysis of sixty-seven cases with
such a reduction showed that Exxon has succeeded in curving the level of punitive
damages awarded but that it has not managed to control the ratio. However, given
the fact that remittitur is within a judge’s discretion, these findings do not exclude
the possibility that judges might have accepted or shared the Court’s concerns over
“skyrocketing” punitive awards.
A fourth key finding derives from stratifying the compensatory damages. The
result is that the ratio becomes low and stable when the amount of compensatory
awards is large. That result warns that it is risky and misleading to analyze damages
awards together, primarily because the ratios significantly differ in both variance and
median.
A fifth main finding was acquired by employing logistic regression models. One
can find that proportionality between punitive and compensatory awards is not the
key factor that influences federal circuit court judges when deciding the
constitutionality of a punitive damages award. Judges consider the amount of
punitive damages awarded in their own right rather than employing or utilizing
ratios.
B. Implications of This Study
The above findings require us to consider the meaning and function of a “ratio”
again when dealing with punitive damages awards. We discuss here whether it is
appropriate for the Court to employ ratio analysis of punitive to compensatory
damages as a crucial factor in appellate court review regarding the constitutionality
of such awards. From an empirical or statistical perspective, is the ratio still a useful
and effective factor? If not, is there a promising alternative?
To answer these questions, it is very helpful for us to rely upon stratification of
damage awards. As shown in Section III.F and Table 11, the ratio and its variation
differences between small and large compensatory damages zones are so significant
that using a ratio calculated by taking into account the whole data is completely
misleading. That is the very point where the analysis breaks down.
157

Id.

158

Id.

159

For the link between the Supreme Court decisions and social changes in general, see
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (2d ed. 2008). Rosenberg argues that even the
Court’s Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954, often cited as a milestone of the Civil
Rights Movement, had quite a limited impact on American society. Id. at 156 (“While it must
be the case that Court action influenced some people, I have found no evidence that this
influence was widespread or of much importance to the battle for civil rights”); see also
Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the
Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32, 34 (2001) (“[T]he public knows little about the Court and
its workings.”). For a more general discussion of law and social change, see Scott L.
Cummings, Empirical Studies of Law and Social Change: What is the Field? What are the
Questions?, 2013 WIS L. REV. 171, 173 (2013).
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Thus, one possible solution to this problem is that the Court suggests handling
punitive damages cases separately by dividing the compensatory awards into several
parts and setting a ratio for each zone. This proposal, however, rests on the premise
that utilizing a ratio is an effective approach.
On the other hand, it is true that judges and juries utilize ratio analysis
differently. As shown in Sections III.E.2-3, while no statistically significant change
before and after Exxon has been observed in the ratios of punitive to compensatory
damages awarded mainly by juries,160 the rate at which punitive damages were
reduced by trial court judges showed a significant rise after Exxon.161 This difference
ultimately derives from each adjudicator’s position and capacity—judges hate to
have their decisions reversed or vacated by upper court judges and tend to hew to the
U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings because of their professional and reputational
interest. Jurors, however, do not have to obey the case law doctrine, such as the
“one-to-one ratio rule” declared in Exxon or the “third party rule” in Philip Morris,
unless they are told to do so by the presiding district court judge. 162 In that regard,
one could say that judge-jury difference in responding toward the Court’s holdings is
all too clear in the results of this study.
However, the relationship between adjudicator selection by litigants and the level
of the ratios still needs further exploration. Literally, the jury is still out on this
question.
C. Limits of the Present Study
Finally, it is of great importance to state what this article does not necessarily
suggest, as well as some notable limitations.
First, this study is intended to be exploratory with a limited sample of data from
appellate court decisions compromised of only 318 punitive damages cases, which is
not sufficient for data analysis. Furthermore, we cannot totally exclude the
possibility that the gathered data is “selective” or distorted precisely because the
source is a commercial database, LexisNexis. These weaknesses should be improved
in the next research.
Another limitation of this study, which should be addressed in the future, is the
unexplained relationship between the amount of punitive damages awarded and the
wealth of defendants. Although the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the
importance of this issue, it has not made clear whether or not it is permissible for a
fact-finder to take into consideration the wealth of a defendant when assessing
punitive damages, and if so, to what extent. The Court will likely have to make a
decision on this point in the near future.
These issues, however, need to be discussed separately in future research.
V. CONCLUSION
It follows from what has been said thus far that the overall trend of the size of
punitive damages awarded has been quite stable over time and not affected by U.S.
Supreme Court decisions such as Philip Morris or Exxon.
160

See supra Tbl.8

161

See supra Tbl.9
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See, e.g., Eisenberg & Heise, Judge-Jury Difference, supra note 22, at 348 (discussing
difference in judge-jury behavior in U.S. Supreme Court decisions).
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Finally, it should be pointed out that disobedience of the federal circuit courts to
the U.S. Supreme Court decisions, with regard to punitive damages awards, does not
necessarily suggest their dysfunction in American society. On the contrary, the
significant stability in the level of punitive damages awarded and ratios of the last
eight years may indicate that the punitive damages regime continuously serves the
social justice purpose of letting the victims of big corporations achieve vindication
through civil lawsuits. This is exactly the raison d’être punitive damages, which
continues to intrigue foreign jurists like us in Japan, because it achieves law
enforcement by private parties, not by bureaucratic order or legislation.
In conclusion, this article contributes to growing literature suggesting the
importance of employing statistical analyses in understanding myth and reality with
regard to punitive damages awards.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss3/7

32

